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Question 
What evidence is there about what has worked in supporting refugees in protracted crises to 
build sustainable livelihoods, with a particular focus on MENA and especially Palestinian 
refugees? Activities such as employability and entrepreneurship support, microfinance, and 
technical & vocational training are of particular interest. 
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1. Overview  
This report summarises recent evidence on what works in supporting refugee livelihoods in 
protracted crises. Particular attention is given to the work of the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in developing livelihoods for 
Palestinian refugees living inside and outside camps in the MENA region
1
. Refugee livelihoods 
programming
 
is understood here as activities that promote wage employment or self-employment 
through skills and vocational training, microfinance, business development and job placement 
(Feinstein International Center, 2012). 
Much of the literature in this area acknowledges the widespread constraints to livelihoods 
development in refugee settings. These include a disabling policy environment, low levels of 
social capital, poverty, and weak baseline levels of training and skills (See: Crawford, Cosgrave, 
Haysom, & Walicki, 2015; Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016; Rohwerder, 2016). Measures to support 
self-sufficiency in situations of protracted population are often severely hampered by restricted 
freedom of movement, weak tailoring of interventions to local economic conditions, and the short-
term or the small scale nature of some programmes (Mcloughlin, 2013). The political context for 
supporting refugee livelihoods can also be hostile and prohibitive: host governments can be 
resistant to any form of livelihoods programming that promotes the ability of refugees to work and 
therefore compete with locals (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016).  
 
While these constraints to livelihoods development are well documented, there is little available 
evidence of what works in addressing them. The evidence base is weak both in terms of its size 
and quality. Previous reviews have concluded there is both a lack of ‘hard evidence and 
preponderance of very small-scale interventions’ in this area (Crawford et al., 2015, p. 31). A 
widely-cited review in 2016 observed that very few independent impact evaluations have been 
carried out (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, p. 11). Much of the data available in the public domain is 
limited to describing static outputs from livelihoods programmes in refugee settings – for 
example, number of target beneficiaries, or descriptive statistics of service uptake - with 
comparatively little consideration of longer-term outcomes on livelihoods, or wider collective 
impacts (ibid). In addition to these limitations, experts point out that since each protracted crisis 
offers its own challenges and constraints, it is probably not advisable to draw comparisons about 
what works across contexts (Crawford et al., 2015; Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016). In view of these 
limitations, improving learning and practice regarding successful approaches to livelihoods 
development has recently been adopted as a key pillar of UNHCR’s Global Strategy for 
Livelihoods, 2014-2018 (UNHCR, 2014).  
The evidence base is weak both generally and with respect to UNRWAs activities in particular. In 
2017, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an evaluation of UNRWA’s 
relevance, effectiveness and efficiency in promoting a decent standard of living for Palestine 
refugees 2010-2015 (UNESC, 2017). The mixed-method design included a meta-review of 42 
evaluation reports, household and intercept surveys of a sample of refugees, field missions to 
Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and the West Bank, and interviews with UNRWA staff.  The evaluation 
concluded that overall ‘although UNRWA has made gains in its monitoring and evaluation 
function, these functions are still underemphasized as tools to help UNRWA learn and improve’ 
(UNESC, 2017, p. 2). The evaluation also concluded that UNRWA had been unsuccessful in 
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promoting the shared goal of a decent standard of living within the agency (ibid). A combination 
of a precarious operating environment, restricted data availability and sub-optimal evaluation 
designs have all hampered the evidence base on UNRWA’s impact on supporting Palestinian 
refugee livelihoods (ibid).  
In light of these limitations, this report is also limited. It identifies only a handful of relevant 
evaluations of livelihoods interventions in protracted crises. While it is not possible based on this 
evidence to give any reliable account of ‘what works’, these evaluations do provide some 
indication that certain activities have seen positive results. In general, more holistic approaches 
that address structural barriers (e.g. integrating measures to secure housing or address land 
rights) while also promoting livelihoods and skills are advocated across the literature. At the 
same time, short-term, ad-hoc interventions (e.g. temporary employment opportunities) have 
been relatively discredited as having little durable impact. 
Since there is considerable guidance-style literature available (in contrast to actual evaluations), 
this report begins with a brief synthesis of what is considered emerging good practice for working 
on refugee livelihoods in protracted crises. It then presents the limited evidence of the outcomes 
and impacts of UNRWA’s and other agencies livelihoods programmes under three broad 
headings: Employability, Technical, Vocational and Educational Training (TVET) and 
Microfinance. 
2. Emerging good practice 
In 2015, ODI undertook a series of case studies on developing livelihoods in protracted 
displacement (Crawford et al., 2015). They identified four broad approaches to programming that 
can work in these settings:  
 Displaced people in urban settings: In urban settings, restrictions on land rights, housing 
tenure rights and the insecure status of informal settlements can undermine livelihoods 
prospects. Livelihoods strategies have therefore been successful where they have 
addressed these barriers as part of a holistic approach. For example, insecure housing 
was found to be a major constraint to IDPs pursuing livelihood initiatives in urban 
settlements in Bosaso, Somalia. In this case, an agreement was developed between 
landholders, the local authorities and displaced people to allow for the upgrading of 
informal settlements. Host and IDP populations were engaged in the process, market 
incentives were provided to reluctant landowners to give secure tenancies, and the 
municipal government was engaged to upgrade services (Decorte & Tempra, 2010, cited 
Crawford et al, 2015). This type of combined approach to improving living conditions, 
access to land, and promoting rights and livelihoods has also seen some success under 
the UNHCR’s Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI)2, in Colombia. 
 Integrated income generation, employment and skills programmes: Ad-hoc, vocational 
training and income generation schemes that target only a small number of beneficiaries 
have been discredited in the literature (Crawford et al., 2015). Many have failed to 
consider the market viability of the skills being imparted, the educational, social and 
psychosocial barriers facing refugees, lack expertise in lending or grants, or fail to forge 





sufficient links with the private sector. Programmes can achieve some success when 
they avoid these pitfalls. For example, in Colombia, a CHF International programme that 
provided a mix of emergency short-term employment (community infrastructure), 
vocational training and job placements and small grants and technical support for micro-
entrepreneurs saw some success. Intensive psychosocial and life skills support was also 
an important component of the programme. The programme supported IDPs to establish 
livelihoods and contributed to improving their self-reliance, while at the same time 
countering stigmatisation and negative perceptions by including other vulnerable people. 
It was tailored to the existing market, and incorporated both the public and private sector. 
 Predictable safety nets and basic social services: Where opportunities for direct support 
to income generation are impossible, supporting education, nutrition and food security 
can still play a crucial, indirect, role in building livelihoods (Crawford et al., 2015). A short 
ODI case study on refugees in Jordan concluded that UNRWA’s safety net is vital for 
helping to indirectly support Palestinian livelihoods (ODI, 2015). Likewise, UNHCR (2014) 
promotes basic consumption support in cash and/or in kind until self-reliance 
benchmarks are met. It also advocates replacing or recovering productive assets as early 
as possible after crisis (ibid). 
 Integrated regional and country development approaches: The World Bank’s Global 
Program on Forced Displacement (GPFD)
3
 is now calling for a more holistic, longer-term, 
response to building refugee livelihoods. This may include, for example, obtaining 
political support at the regional and national level to provide major regional infrastructure 
investments. 
Across the policy and practice literature, a number of other themes recur about good practices 
for programming in this area. These include: 
 Promoting the right to work: This is a key pillar of UNHCR’s refugee livelihoods strategy 
(UNHCR, 2014). Refugees are considered better able to contribute fully to local 
communities when they can work legally, access resources and services, create 
businesses, and pay taxes. To this end, UNHCR aims to pursue greater dialogue with 
authorities, engage local business, and invest more in institutions to benefit the entire 
community (ibid). 
 Advocacy and policy dialogue: In hostile political situations, advocacy may have to be 
carefully calculated and co-ordinated between agencies to avoid provoking a negative 
response from government (Feinstein International Center, 2012). UNHCR has 
committed to defining more specific targets for building a favourable policy environment 
(UNHCR, 2014)
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. Specifically, it suggests commissioning research that can establish an 
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 Issues for dialogue with national and local authorities include: ‘recognition of diplomas and professional 
certifications, access to land and productive natural resources, access to work permits, freedom of movement, 
freedom of association, access to financial services, access to training and learning opportunities, access to 
formal and informal employment, right of business ownership and membership in business associations’ 
(UNHCR, 2014, p. 20). 
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evidence-base on the economic contribution of refugees to local economies and host 
communities. 
 Adopting an inclusive approach: Leading agencies argue that all livelihoods programming 
should adopt an inclusive approach that targets both nationals and non-nationals 
(refugees, migrants, host communities) so as to avoid parallel programming (Feinstein 
International Center, 2012). Such joint programming can in theory reduce antagonism 
between communities, helping to dispel any government resistance in the process, and 
also create opportunities for refugees to build networks and capital outside their 
communities. 
 Using a graduated (or laddered) approach: Livelihoods programming should be 
calibrated to the stages of community skill development. Refugees at different stages of 
transition – whether coping, adapting or accumulating – will require different types of 
intervention (Feinstein International Center, 2012).  
 Linking along the value chain: Joining up different types of interventions - for example, 
microfinance with business development - is considered key (Feinstein International 
Center, 2012). This includes, for example, pairing mental and physical health 
interventions with livelihoods programming where necessary.  
 Promoting self-reliance: Kamau and Fox (2013) develop a theory of change and set of 
interventions they argue would underpin more effective self-reliance programming, with 
the ultimate goal of helping refugees to cope, adapt and thrive wherever they settle. They 
recommend donors should engage in more partnerships with government and the private 
sector, conduct more rigorous baseline analysis, and also undertake political economy 
analysis to understand how power dynamics affect the livelihood options of refugees and 
IDPs. More specifically, they advocate the supply of cash instead of food transfers (which 
are traded for cash anyway), to enable more refugees to engage in lucrative cross-border 
trade, and encourage them to move out of camps (Kamau and Fox, 2013). 
 Context assessment and planning: Jacobsen and Fratzke (2016) argue that failure to 
account for political, practical and economic barriers are the main reasons why 
livelihoods programmes for refugees fail. Tools such as Emergency Market Mapping 
Assessment can help tailor specific labour market interventions, can be useful (ibid). 
UNHCR is advocating better use of available data about the refugee population and the 
economy, better targeting, selection of partners that take a market-oriented, longer-term 
approach, and stronger monitoring and evaluation (UNHCR, 2014). 
3. Employability  
Cross-country reviews stress that the ability of donors to connect refugees with employment 
ultimately depends on the availability of jobs in the local economy (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016). In 
general, employability programmes have failed where they haven’t provided training that 
matches the local economic environment. In contrast, a project with Iraqi women in Jordan was 
deemed successful partly because it adapted to labour market restrictions; rather than training 
women to enter wage employment that was ultimately unattainable for them, it focused on 
helping them to develop home-based businesses (ibid).  
Assessments of UNRWA’s activities to support a decent standard of living for Palestinian 
refugees are mixed. In a survey carried out in 2015, a significant portion of UNRWA staff (41 per 
cent) reported the agency’s work on providing a decent standard of living had become somewhat 
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less effective since 2010. While 51 per cent thought UNRWA was ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ effective 
in increasing employability and livelihoods, 49 per cent thought it ‘somewhat’ or ‘very ineffective’. 
The majority cited austerity measures along with rising needs among the refugee population for 
these ratings (UNESC, 2017, p. 14). 
A recent survey of livelihoods of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon (PRL) found the majority of 
employed refugees work in low-paying, low-skilled jobs and often subject to harsh, exploitative 
and insecure working conditions (AUB, 2015). As of 2015, the unemployment rate among PRL 
was 23 per cent (a significant increase from the 2010 rate of 8 per cent); this rate is around 31 
per cent for women (AUB, 2015). Youth employment among Palestinian refugees is higher, at 
around 57 per cent (AUB, 2015, p. 181). Moreover, employment restrictions mean higher levels 
of education and training do not necessarily have a positive impact on employment levels (ibid). 
Engaging Youth (EY) Project, UNRWA Syria 
This multifaceted project aims to build the resilience of, and improve employment outcomes for 
young Palestinian and Iraqi refugees living in Syria. It provides continuing education, career 
guidance, business development support, and life skills training. In 2012, the project was 
externally evaluated using a combination of direct observation, key informant interviews, small 
scale surveys and focus groups. The evaluators concluded that overall, there was insufficient 
data on the main objective of improving young refugees’ chances of finding long-term 
employment. However, some of the activities were reportedly successful in achieving shorter-
term outcomes, as follows: 
 Youth employment centre: Located within the largest Palestinian camp in Syria, this 
provided a focal point for young people to congregate and access employment services. 
The centres’ visibility was considered important to the overall cohesion of the project.  
 Short-term vocational courses: A range of short-term courses
5
, previously only offered 
through UNRWA's Training Centre in Damascus (DTC), were extended to all 12 camps in 
which Engaging Youth operates. These courses proved popular and achieved the target 
number of beneficiaries (3273 Palestinians and Iraqis enrolled in vocational courses, out 
of which 2986 graduated). In the evaluation survey, 63 per cent of the 300 youth who 
attended short courses believed it had improved not only their career situation, but their 
personal and professional development. Trainees felt the courses were in areas that 
were both of interest to young people, and tailored to the employment market. Around 36 
per cent of trainees had secured employment at the time of the survey. The evaluators 
concluded that ‘this is a considerable result in a period of political instability and with 
economic challenges that Syrian industries faced during the second year of the project’ 
(UNRWA, 2012, p. 48). The evaluation recommended that vocational courses include a 
two-week mandatory work placement, and that a central agency be established to work 
with the private sector to source employment opportunities. It also recommended that in 
future, the vocational training component should be merged with the career guidance 
component, since these are cross-cutting. 
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 Graduate training courses: were also offered, at which attendance was good - around 
88.9 per cent of graduates attended more than half of the courses and 88 per cent rated 
themselves as having felt good about their results in the exam. The evaluation survey 
found that 79 per cent of graduates believed the training offered matched market needs. 
Three months after graduation, 552 out of 1303 graduated Palestinian trainees were 
employed - around 42 per cent.  
 Career guidance centres: These centres aimed to provide young job-seekers with the 
tools and skills to identify and pursue their longer-term career goals. In practice, career 
guidance involved individual counselling sessions (one to one sessions to create a career 
plan) and group workshops on employability skills. Six modules were taught: self-
awareness, professional communication, negotiation and problem solving, job search 
techniques and CV writing. The results were moderately positive. More than 20 per cent 
of job seekers who went through career guidance found a job though direct referral (143 
people) or on their own (249 people), despite the prevailing climate of economic 
uncertainty and associated fluctuations in the job market. In a survey of 214 
beneficiaries, 90 per cent reported the career guidance program had increased their self-
confidence, particularly when seeking jobs in the private sector (UNRWA, 2012, p. 53). 
 Entrepreneurship development: Intensive business skills training courses were delivered 
according to a CEFE approach (Competency-based Economies for the Formation of 
Enterprise) developed by GTZ
6
. During focus group discussions, beneficiaries stated that 
the training provided them with concrete tools and business ideas, and helped them to 
manage their business. The project also incorporated an advocacy campaign to raise 
awareness of entrepreneurship, entitled “Start your business, start your life". Through 
posters, group discussions and social media (Facebook), it aimed to highlight the 
benefits and the risks of entrepreneurship as well as to change perceptions surrounding 
micro-credit. The impact of this component was not evaluated. The evaluators suggest 
future campaigns should capitalise on previous success stories and integrate them into 
awareness-raising sessions. 
As elsewhere, data management somewhat impaired the monitoring and evaluation of this 
project. Evaluators noted that data was collected by numerous individuals working on different 
components of the overall project. This type of data was ‘not compiled in a way that could 
produce statistical interpretation or offer a way to track the progress of the youth in the different 
departments over time’. The evaluators suggested that in future, the project might usefully track 
outcome indicators that would highlight the link between the components. For example, the 
number of youth volunteers employed following career guidance support and/or vocational 
training; or the number of participants in adult classes with a child or sibling participating in other 
activities.  
Job Creation Programme, UNRWA, Gaza 
The Job Creation Programme (JCP) provided cash to professional, skilled and unskilled refugees 
in exchange for short-term work assignments. Employment was contracted directly by UNRWA 
Field Offices for internal and external assignments of between three to twelve months. The 
programme was funded out of an emergency (as opposed to general) fund. It was evaluated in 
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2015 using a mixed methods design based on consultations, data analysis and focus group 
discussions. The evaluators concluded JCP did not create jobs and had little impact on food 
security or alleviating poverty. They also observed weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation 
concluding it was not possible to quantify the programmes’ impact ‘due to a lack of poverty and 
food insecurity data’ (PAI & ATOS Consulting, 2015, p. 3). The evaluators recommended that in 
future, UNRWA must move beyond measuring outputs, to evaluating outcomes.  
The programme’s gender component was considered successful. Through the JCP, women in 
Gaza were given opportunities to work in non-traditional positions (packing factories, agricultural 
sector) previously culturally restricted to men. Overall, however, the programme’s impact was 
limited by prevailing structural poverty and Gaza’s economic blockade. Evaluators also partially 
attributed limited results to some of the programme’s design features, including: 
 No systematic exclusion/inclusion of eligible groups. UNRWA had used complaints 
boxes and community outreach officers to try and safeguard against exclusion of 
eligible groups. 
 Operating with a short-term perspective. Most beneficiaries only received income 
from JCP for a short period. Evaluators concluded it was unrealistic to have expected 
a cash-for-work scheme to improve food security, given the very short-term nature of 
the inputs.  
 Feedback from JCP beneficiaries was negative, perceiving the jobs as too short-
term, distributed unfairly, and with long waiting times.  The reported average waiting 
time for a three month position was between five and seven years. 
Based on these findings, evaluators recommended DFID withdraw funding from JCP, and 
suggested DFID funding might have a more sustainable impact on poverty if disbursed through 
the General Fund.  
The programme was later evaluated using mixed methods, including longitudinal survey data 
(TRANSTEC, 2016). As above, this evaluation also found that evidence of JCP’s impact on wider 
socio-economic trends and household security was limited. Nevertheless, it concluded that the 
programme was effective as a ‘resilience programme’, meaning it developed individual capacity 
to cope with shocks. That was because it reduced individual debt and improved food security for 
most participants. Participants were also positive about the programme’s impact on their 
standing in their families and communities. Surveys found that 30 per cent of survey respondents 
from the first cohort, 19 per cent from the second, and 69 per cent from the third were either part 
or full time employed 6 months – a year after the end of their contract. Analysis of respondents’ 
self-esteem/self-concept showed minimal change for the first two cohorts and a positive increase 
for the third cohort, which the evaluators attributed to the much higher employment figures in that 
cohort. There was also evidence that there was a positive increase in capital investments among 
participating businesses when compared with non-participating businesses from the same 
sectors. This was attributed to the gains that business made from ‘free labour’, which in turn 
prompted them to become better at managing and investing in their businesses. 
The two contrasting evaluations of the same programme perhaps reflect the different 
perspectives on the programme’s success criteria. The first evaluates the impact primarily on 
poverty mitigation and food security, whereas the second looks at a wider range of criteria, 
including impacts on participating businesses. It is important to note that while the JCP may be 
expected to have some positive livelihoods related impacts, it is essentially set up as a poverty 
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mitigation programme. UNRWA also run various other programmes and projects directly and 
indirectly creating employment opportunities for Palestinian refugees, but no evaluation evidence 
was available. 
More generally UNHCR’s 2014-2018 strategy advocates employing refugee workers in relief 
efforts wherever possible, including building, camp management and maintenance, and provision 
of essential services including food distribution, health, education, and protection-related 
functions (UNHCR, 2014). It argues that ‘while employment may be temporary, it contributes to 
helping refugees maintain their assets and develop new skills’ (UNHCR, 2014, p. 28). 
4. Technical, Vocational and Educational Training (TVET)  
UNHCR advocates a range of TVET activities for refugees, from language and IT training, life-
skills and employability training, to entrepreneurship training, to the provision of locally 
recognised diplomas (UNHCR, 2014). It is also, more recently, seeking to develop new ways of 
providing employment online, through data-outsourcing and ‘microwork’ (a series of small tasks 
that contribute towards a larger project and are completed by many individuals over the Internet) 
(ibid).  
 
In 2016, a conference of donors working in MENA concluded that improving the quality of TVET 
is imperative for increasing graduate employability, as well as ensuring higher demand for TVET 
(UNICEF, 2016). The conference noted that TVET is currently ‘associated with low quality 
education that does not provide concrete prospects for employment’ (ibid, p. 15). It also found 
evidence of employer dissatisfaction with young TVET graduates (ibid, p. 15). The main reasons 
for this were poor technical knowledge and inadequate soft skills. Providing better life skills 
education was therefore a major recommendation of the conference. 
Evidence from elsewhere suggests that TVET activities may be more impactful in locations 
where refugees have the right to work and the economy is functioning, such as Jordan. In less 
enabling circumstances, labour market restrictions can hamper the sustainability and success of 
technical and vocational education and training (UNESC, 2017). There is also potted evidence 
that the impact of TVET interventions is reduced where they only target a small number of 
beneficiaries relative to the overall size of the camp population. A qualitative evaluation of 
UNHCR’s response to the protracted crisis of Eritrean refugees in Eastern Sudan noted that 
although a range of vocational and skills training were being provided in some camps (e.g. in car 
mechanics, auto-electricity, driving, and computer literacy and advanced tailoring), their impact 
was limited by their small scale relative to the overall size of the camp population (Ambroso et al, 
2011). The evaluation team also raised concerns about how realistic it was that trainees would 
be able to apply these skills in practice, given the high levels of underemployment in the local 
economy, coupled with widespread discrimination against Eritreans in the workforce. 
Nevertheless, the evaluation observed that these programmes had some less tangible benefits in 
terms of building community solidarity and individual self-efficacy (ibid).  
There is very little evaluation of UNRWA’s TVET activities available in the public domain. 
UNRWA provides Palestinian refugees with technical and vocational education and training in 
difficult contexts characterised by high unemployment, especially among youth
7
. There is some 
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evidence that TVET is rated favourably by respondents. The OIOS reported in 2012 that among 
survey respondents who received UNRWA training, satisfaction with TVET is high: 85 per cent 
were satisfied with their experience, while 94 per cent reported that it would likely help them 
secure employment (UNESC, 2017). Specifically, when asked “To what extent will the training 
you received help you secure employment in the future?”, 51 per cent of respondents reported 
‘very much’ and 43 per cent ‘somewhat’ (UNESC, 2017, p. 20). This is also reflected in the 
positive assessment among UNRWA staff. When asked “How effective would you say UNRWA 
has been in each of the following specific programmatic areas (TVET, microfinance) over 2010-
2015?”, TVET was rated more highly than microfinance services.8 There is also evidence that 
employers are satisfied. According to UNRWA’s 2016 annual report, employers across Gaza, the 
West Bank, Jordan and Lebanon are satisfied with the quality of TVET graduates (based on a 
survey of 400 employers of graduates from the UNRWA TVET programme who rated them a 
mean of 2.07 on a scale of 0-3) (UNRWA, 2016, p. 36). 
In its 2016 annual report, UNRWA reported it is developing effective partnerships for engaging 
youth and developing their skills for employability (UNRWA, 2016). In the West Bank, for 
example, it has built capacity for volunteerism and public speaking. In Jordan, it has focused on 
IT skills. In Lebanon, it has trained 270 Palestine refugee youth on leadership, team building and 
community needs assessment. The outcomes of these activities are not reported however. In 
general, available data suggests that employment rates for graduates of UNRWA technical and 
vocational education and training programmes declined between 2010 and 2015 (UNESC, 
2017). The number of graduate training contracts awarded has been increasing since 2012, from 
around 11,000 to 27,000 (UNESC, 2017, p. 14). 
Data gaps combined with a rapidly shifting context make it challenging to attribute changes in 
employment and livelihoods to specific interventions. Accordingly, in 2017 the OIOS noted that 
‘while the data for technical and vocational education and training and job creation 
programme/graduate training programme point to the employability of those participating in 
UNRWA interventions, they do not factor in the overall need for employability interventions, 
rendering it impossible to gauge the contribution of UNRWA to increasing overall employability 
across the entirety of its targeted population’ (UNESC, 2017, p. 14).  
Palestinian Livelihood Project, Lebanon (World Vision) 
This project, implemented by World Vision Lebanon (WVL) in partnership with the Palestinian 
Arab Women League (PAWL), aimed to improve the livelihoods of vulnerable families living in 
Palestinian refugee camps. It operated between 2012-2015, targeting a small group (1400) of 
women and families. It developed Community Business Councils (CBCs) and Business Networks 
(BN) in the Burj Al Chemali and Al Bus refugee camps (World Vision, 2016). 
The intervention was subsequently evaluated through surveys and focus groups. The evaluation 
measured two outcomes: i) The targeted Palestinian community has increased access to micro-
loans and embedded Business Development Services and ii) The targeted Palestinian 
community has improved business development knowledge and skills, business networks and 
environment. Over the course of the intervention, some 300 business owners accessed loans, 
and 47 per cent of loan beneficiaries reported an increase in income. 90 percent were providing 
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for the basic needs of their children. Results on the second outcome were more modest: The 
project provided an opportunity for community members to join business networks and councils. 
While between 60-70 per cent participated in networks and councils, 26 per cent actually 
collaborated to share business information and skills, 53 per cent reported improvement on 
sales, competitive advantage, negotiations and marketing, and 70 per cent of respondents 
reported either stable or increased levels in profitability. A majority of business owners (88 per 
cent) who received direct assistance from the project and belonged to a CBC or BN reported an 
acceptable or high confidence level in their business. Evaluators concluded that as business 
owners were able to find more support in networks their confidence level increases and 
eventually yields an increase in income. 
Sustainability was identified as a challenge for this project and was consequently given a low 
rating. This was due to the capacity of the CBC board members being relatively under-developed 
across important fields such as leadership, communication, advocacy, strategic planning, 
networking and social group management skills. 
5. Microfinance  
UNHCR advocates savings, credit, money transfers and micro insurance for supporting 
livelihoods among refugee populations on the basis that they can ‘help safeguard assets, build 
financial capital, and open economic opportunities. Reliable sources of credit can provide a basis 
for planning and expanding business activities’ (UNHCR, 2014, p. 8). A recent UNHCR stocktake 
of microfinance provision in protracted refugee settings concluded that ‘more robust analyses’ 
are needed (Azorbo, 2011, p. 24). A crucial success factor is whether loans are of a sufficient 
size to be invested in income generation (as opposed to merely supporting subsistence) 
(Ambroso et al, 2011). A UNHCR review concluded microfinance programmes can improve 
livelihoods in protracted population displacement in three ways: by increasing household 
economic security, individual human and social capital, and community credit culture and market 
stimulation of the market (Azorbo, 2011). For example, one UNHCR microfinance project in an 
IDP camp in Lira, northern Uganda, reported positive results in terms of increased economic 
security, increased human and social capital, enhanced credit culture and stimulation of the 
market. Further, recipients of a UNHCR-sponsored microcredit programme in Costa Rica 
reported that loans improved their quality of life and household income. Overall, however, 
rigorous or detailed evidence remains slim (ibid).  
In terms of UNRWA’s activities in this area, the 2017 OIOS concluded it has had mixed success 
on microfinance. UNRWA online data tends to report on loan disbursement and value, with little 
information about impact or loan use (UNRWA, 2016). Based on this data, there is some 
evidence that loan recipients were positive about their experience (UNESC, 2017). The 
aggregate value of all UNRWA microfinance/microcredit loans declined from 2009 to 2015 
agency-wide, which can be explained by the economic and war-torn climate in the region. The 
value of loans to refugees decreased in all locations except Gaza. Of the UNRWA loan recipients 
surveyed, 73 per cent reported that the loan had helped improve their living conditions somewhat 
or very much since 2014 (UNESC, 2017, p. 19). Credits and loans also received fairly high 
approval ratings in the OIOS evaluation. When respondents were asked “To what extent did the 
UNRWA service improve your living circumstances between January 2014 and the present?”, 30 
per cent reported ‘very much’ and 43 per cent ‘somewhat’, respectively. Respondents considered 
this to have increased their living standards more than the provision of food or cash (UNESC, 
2017, p. 20). 
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 Data from 2015 suggests a significant portion of UNRWAs credit portfolio is reaching young 
people. Some loan products are more attractive to young clients than others. Specifically, the 
gender-specific women’s household credit (WHC) product accounts for 31 per cent of clients with 
loans. Around a quarter (24 per cent) of recipients of the microenterprise credit (MEC) product 
were youth. They reportedly run a wide range of microenterprises in the service, commerce, 
industry and agricultural sectors (UNRWA, 2015, p. 3). According to UNRWA’s 2016 annual 
report, the microfinance programme achieved a milestone in generating a net income (profit) of 
US$ 2,263,992 in 2016 (UNRWA, 2016, p. 35). 
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